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‘Lobbying in this country is getting out of control. Today it is a £2b industry that has a huge 
presence in Parliament. The Hansard Society has estimated that some MPs are 
approached over one hundred times a week by lobbyists . . . We can’t go on like this.’ 
 
David Cameron, 2010.  
 
It is almost ten years since the publication of my report Friend or Foe: Lobbying in British Democracy, 
and six years since David Cameron used its findings as a basis for his 2010 speech on lobbying 
(Parvin, 2007). The speech, delivered at the University of East London two months before the general 
election, was a major part of the Conservatives’ campaign. In it, Cameron pledged to tackle those 
sources of corruption, secrecy, and unfairness which caused citizens to become cynical about the 
British democratic system. The speech, and the campaign of which it was a part, captured the political 
zeitgeist of that time. After the MPs expenses scandal, public confidence in politics and politicians had 
reached a new low. Rates of political participation plummeted, faith in politics declined, and the 
disconnection between the people and their elected representatives arguably became wider than it 
had ever been (Parvin, 2015a).  
 
Cameron’s speech conveyed a simple message that proved popular with a public only too willing to 
believe the worst about British politics, a message that has been strengthened over the course of 
decades by the vast majority of the British media, and which profoundly shaped the decision by so 
many in Britain to vote to leave the EU in the recent referendum (Parvin, 2015b). Labour, he said, had 
allowed the British political system to become too elitist. Power that rightfully belonged to the British 
people had been moved upwards to the EU and other supranational institutions, and downwards to 
local and regional quangos all of which operated beyond the conventional checks and balances our 
system has established in order to ensure transparency and accountability. Meanwhile, in the middle 
between the local and supranational, central institutions had become diminished in power and 
authority, and also secretive and insular. The further democratic institutions (and the people who 
worked in them) had retreated from the people, the easier it had become for MPs to falsify their 
expenses, for corporate lobbyists to strike deals with elected politicians, and for decisions to be made 
behind closed doors. What political power remained at the centre had become concentrated among a 
cosy clique of politicians and powerful vested interests.  
 
Cameron’s diagnosis of the problem in 2010 struck a chord, as did his solution, which comprised two 
principal elements: a form of localism which gave power to local people rather than to local or regional 
quangos which claimed to speak on their behalf, and new laws aimed at increasing transparency and 
fairness at the level of national policy making (Parvin, 2009 & 2011). A vote for the Conservatives, he 
suggested, was a vote to end the ‘secret corporate lobbying’ that had ‘tainted our democracy for too 
long’. They would wrest power from big business in order to end their unfair dominance of the 
democratic system and give power back to the British people.  
 
But they haven’t. In fact, they have deliberately and methodically strengthened the power of large 
corporations to influence elected politicians at the expense of smaller organisations, and have 
diminished our democracy as a result. Under the pretence of addressing citizens’ concerns about 
lobbying, the government has in fact been waging a quiet and continuing war against those 
institutions and organisations capable of holding the government to account. Since they took office in 
2010, the Conservatives have sought to restructure the institutions of British democracy in order to 
remove sources of dissent and to ensure their electoral dominance not just in the short term but for 
generations to come, and they have done so while claiming that their actions are intended to remove 
the undue influence of big business, equalise access to politicians, and put people, not business, at 
the heart of the democratic system. Furthermore, they have gone about this in a way that directly 
seeks to undermine the development of a leftist political movement at its root. Just as they have 
deliberately and methodically strengthened the power of large organisations relative to smaller ones, 
they have also deliberately weakened, or removed entirely, those civic, social, and other institutions 
which have traditionally mobilised social democratic activism and consciousness, while leaving intact 
those other organisations and institutions which have traditionally supported conservatism and 
markets. To see how and why this is the case, and to grasp the scale of the problem facing the left in 
Britain today, let us consider in some detail the recent steps that the government has taken to 
address widespread concerns about vested interests, first, in new rules governing the public funding 
of charities, and second, in the regulation of political lobbying more generally. 
1. Charities and the government’s fake war on lobbyists. 
 
In February 2016, the government announced that it would be changing the rules governing the 
allocation of public funding to charities and what charities in receipt of public grants could spend their 
money on. These new rules state that any funding agreement between the government and the 
organisation in question will, from May, stipulate that no part of that public funding can be used to 
‘support activity intended to influence . . . Parliament, Government or political parties . . . [or] to 
influence legislative or regulatory action’ (Hope & Ward, 2015). The policy is grounded in research 
published in 2012 by the Institute for Economic Affairs, which raised concerns about the amount of 
public money that was being used to lobby for niche interests, many of which do not enjoy widespread 
public support (Snowdon, 2012).  
 
The proposals have thus far caused widespread concern among academics, in particular about the 
stifling effects that they have on public debate and the use of certain forms of expertise in policy 
making. Scientists, for example, have expressed concern that the new rules effectively prohibit them 
from communicating their research to government, dramatically reducing the quality of public debate 
in a wide range of areas including embryo research, climate change, and public health (McKie, 2016). 
And social and political scientists in receipt of public grants who uncover evidence that government 
policy may perhaps be misguided may now be prohibited from discussing this fact, or communicating 
their findings to government, for fear of violating the new ‘anti-lobbying’ rules. The Cabinet Office has 
promised to review the policy with regard to scientists and other academics. But it has not pledged to 
review the policy with regard to charities. 
 
The funding of voluntary organisations and charities consumes a significant proportion of Britain’s 
annual budget. Last year, for example, the government distributed in excess of £10b to voluntary 
sector organisations, including some of the UK’s largest charities which, in recent years, have taken 
on greater responsibility for the delivery of, as well as advocacy for, essential services for some of the 
most vulnerable men, women, and children in the UK and abroad. Also included is money given to 
smaller charities intended to help them achieve their charitable ends and represent their constituent 
members (National Audit Office, 2015). According to IEA figures, in 2012, 27,000 charities of varying 
sizes were dependent on the government for 75% of their total income (Snowdon, 2012; 19). Many of 
these organisations, both large and small, use this money to support campaigning activities aimed at 
seeking policy change.  
 
The government thinks this is a problem, although not for the same reasons as the IEA. Indeed, the 
government’s proposals appear to entrench one of the IEA’s central concerns about the practice, 
which was that publicly funded charities become an extension of government. The IEA’s chief concern 
is that charities that are dependent on government funding for their survival have an incentive to 
support, rather than criticise, the government; an incentive to not bite the hand that feeds. The 
government’s concern, on the other hand, seems to be that too much money is being given to groups 
who then use that money to criticize government policy. For after all, lobbying and campaigning both 
seek change. Both seek to use creative means to change the government’s mind, not to support the 
decisions it has already made. Hence, when Cabinet Minister Matthew Hancock stated in support of 
the new rules that ‘[t]axpayers' money must be spent on improving people's lives and spreading 
opportunities, not wasted on the farce of government lobbying government,’ he meant that public 
money should not be used in the practice of publicly criticizing the government, exposing weaknesses 
in its policy agenda, and campaigning for alternative courses of action (Hope & Ward, 2015). The 
government believes that charities should remain apolitical. They should not be using public money to 
employ lobbyists, policy advisers, and such like to criticize the government. They should be using it to 
help the people it claims to be concerned about. Charities should ‘do good works’ instead of lobbying 
for policy change. 
 
But this distinction is false. Often, the most effective way in which charities can defend their members’ 
interests, or improve the lives of those people with whom they are concerned, is to try to persuade the 
government to reform laws which harm those interests or those people. This is especially true of small 
charities, for whom the question of how to maximize the use of relatively meagre funds is of 
paramount, and increasing, importance. Small and medium-sized organisations (that is, those who 
have an annual income of less than £1m) have seen disproportionately severe falls in income and 
assets relative to larger organisations since 2007, with recorded declines of around 38% as a result 
of, among other things, the withdrawal of public grants. Small and medium-sized charities are thus 
under particular pressure to maximise the impact that their small, and dwindling, funds can achieve. 
The decision of how best to spend their money is thus complex and finely-balanced. How might a 
small charity like ASH (Action on Smoking and Health) most effectively spend its annual income of 
£800,000 in their fight against a global tobacco industry worth around £500b? How might a public 
health charity most effectively spend £1m in the fight against cancer? Would it be best to spend it on 
the refurbishment of a hospice? Or would it be better to commission a scientific study which provides 
evidence that a change in government policy would result in fewer deaths, and then organize a 
campaign that communicates this to government? Is it better for a homelessness charity to spend its 
money on food parcels or a campaign that secures more funding and opportunities for people living 
on the street? The answer will not always be the same. Sometimes it will be better to provide food 
parcels or better respite care. But often a charity’s goals will be more effectively achieved through 
high profile political and media campaigning aimed at securing real, lasting, structural change. As Sir 
Stephen Bubb, chief executive of the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations, 
recently put it, ‘campaigning is the lifeblood of the great British charitable tradition. We work to 
alleviate the symptoms of disease and poverty and to tackle the causes of such.’ Spending ‘every 
penny on the front line of a charity leads to collapse. Money spent on  . . . fundraising and 
campaigning is central to charities’ survival’ (Bubb, 2015). The government does not agree. On the 
contrary, it believes that public funding should only be available to those organisations which keep 
quiet, stay out of politics, and – most importantly of all – avoid criticizing it or engaging in practices 
which put it under any pressure to change its mind or admit it is wrong.  
 
The government does not describe its position in this way, of course. It argues that the new measures 
are part of the wider commitment to addressing concerns among citizens about lobbying and the 
decline of democracy that David Cameron outlined in 2010. Indeed, these rules cannot be fully 
understood independently of the steps the government have already taken to rein in lobbyists. But in 
the 10 years since that speech, what steps has the government taken, and what have been their 
effects on British democracy? 
 
The government’s central response was to introduce the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party 
Campaigning, and Trade Union Administration Act in 2014. The Act sought to introduce a new 
regulatory framework for the lobbying industry which – up until 2014 – regulated itself through an 
internally created voluntary code of conduct policed by professional bodies such as the Association 
for Professional Political Consultants (APPC). The Act replaced self-regulation, brought in a 
compulsory register for lobbyists, and introduced new measures requiring lobbyists to record, and 
give details about, their meetings with government officials. The Act was heralded by the government 
as a significant step in the crackdown on the kind of lobbying by unelected organisations which David 
Cameron said in 2010 had got out of control and which had become a central cause for concern 
among the public. 
 
The Act did little to address the public’s concerns, however. The regulatory reforms it introduced were 
widely criticised for being incoherent, piecemeal and unfit for purpose. Graham Allen, the Chair of the 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee at the time, described the proposals as ‘unsatisfactory’ 
and a ‘dog’s breakfast,’ a view shared by many Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. Lobbyists 
themselves were also critical, but not for the reasons that the Government expected. What angered 
them was not the fact that they could now no longer act with impunity, but that they were now forced 
to comply with a regulatory system that made no sense and which actually failed to afford their 
activities any greater legitimacy. Many public affairs professionals are not corrupt, but genuinely 
seeking social and political change in line with goals that they believe in. These people wanted 
greater transparency as much as anyone else, in order that their role in democracy could be clarified 
and supported. 
 
They didn’t get it, however. This, it soon became clear, was because the principal purpose of the Act 
was not in fact to increase the transparency of lobbying by imposing stricter rules on lobbying firms. It 
was to strip charities, interest groups and, in particular, trade unions of the power to criticise 
Government policy. This becomes clearer once we understand what and who is, and is not, covered 
by the new legislation. Firstly, the Act requires that only a fraction of the activities of lobbyists need to 
be recorded: only meetings between lobbyists and ministers and permanent secretaries are 
regulated. Meetings between lobbyists and other government officials including special advisers and 
civil servants more junior than permanent secretaries (i.e. almost all of them) are excluded. Secondly, 
the Act currently covers around 1% of lobbyists. While it covers political consultants working on behalf 
of a variety of clients, it excludes in-house lobbyists who push for the interests of the organisations 
that they work for. So while consultants working on behalf of corporate and non-corporate clients are 
covered, in-house lobbyists working for Google, Microsoft, investment banks, law firms, tobacco and 
alcohol firms, pharmaceutical companies, and trade associations like the CBI are not, and while the 
funding, and the most effective campaigning activities available to trade unions, charities, and other 
smaller interest groups, are squeezed by the measures contained in the Act, the lobbying activities, 
and the funding, of big corporate organisations are not. 
 
Under the pretence of addressing citizens’ concerns about the unfairness of lobbying, therefore, the 
government actually imposed new legislation which increased the unfairness of the system and 
increased the disproportionate influence enjoyed by big businesses and wealthy organisations, by 
introducing measures aimed specifically at dramatically restricting the free speech of ‘non-party 
groups’ like interest groups and charitable organisations to communicate their concerns to the 
government, and imposing stringent new restrictions on the activities of these and other organisations 
like trade unions to campaign on behalf of their members. Government amendments to its initial 
proposals, introduced in the wake of an unprecedented backlash from charities and third sector 
organisations, still resulted in the slashing of permissible spending by non-party groups by half, and a 
raft of other measures aimed at reducing the ability of interest groups to ‘influence the outcome of 
elections’ by expressing their concerns and pointing out the flaws in government policy at the only 
time that politicians might take notice: when they are campaigning for re-election.  
 
The view expressed by some at the time – that the restrictions placed on charities and other small 
political organisations were an accidental or incidental cost associated with the bigger fight against 
corporate corruption among larger organisations – was therefore never compelling. However, it is 
even less so now in the light of the new measures concerning the public funding of charities that I 
mentioned earlier. The Government’s new rules on the public funding of charities further entrenches 
the political inequality that the Lobbying Act created, and embodies the same desire on the part of the 
government to suppress criticism from charities and third sector organisations, as well as (for the 
moment, at least) scientists, academic researchers, and others whose expertise leads them to 
question government policy. It is also uses the same strategy adopted in the Lobbying Act: to 
introduce wide-ranging new restrictions on the activities of charities and interest groups without, at the 
same time, similarly restricting the activities of corporate lobbyists in the private sector. The Lobbying 
Act not only failed to level the playing field with regard to access to decision makers, it introduced 
more severe imbalances. And now these new rules have made the situation even worse. The 
government has entrenched already-existing structural imbalances in the system, further squeezing 
marginal voices from the democratic process as a consequence. Under new rules and under this 
government, charities and smaller non-party organisations have fewer and fewer avenues available to 
them to represent their constituent members or to do the ‘good works’ that the government believes 
they should do.  
 
Both the IEA and the government miss the point, therefore. The central issue is not whether charities 
should use government money to lobby, but rather, whether the government believes that it is 
important to support charities at all. If the government believes that it has a role in financially 
supporting charities in order to achieve their aims and to, in the words of Matthew Hancock, ‘improve 
lives’ and ‘spread opportunities’, then it needs to accept the fact that this will often be best achieved 
through lobbying and campaigning activities conducted in a wider context of political equality in which 
wealthy organisations are not permitted to dominate the process. The government needs to accept 
that a commitment to charitable causes means, in practice, allowing government money to be used to 
lobby for change. And it also requires a commitment to ensuring a genuinely level playing field which 
does not introduce structural obstacles in the way of small organisations in the way that it currently 
does. Lobbying is often effective, which is why so many organisations – big and small – believe it to 
be a good use of resources. It should not be an option open only to rich organisations with thousands 
or millions of members, or private corporations with vast resources at their disposal. Small 
organisations can punch above their weight in policy discussions if they are given the opportunity of 
speaking to politicians on equal terms with very large, formidably resourced organisations. But this 
requires government action aimed at securing equality of access and the formal recognition of the 
right of all organisations to get a fair hearing. In particular, it requires precisely the measures designed 
to rein in the unfair influence of businesses and wealthy organisations that the Lobbying Act was 
supposed to deliver but did not.  
 
2. The real war on dissent.  
 
The new rules governing the use of public money by charities, considered in isolation, may seem 
wrongheaded but not especially sinister. Similarly, the entrenchment of unfairness caused by the 
Lobbying Act might, in isolation, seem like a mistake and not representative of anything more 
insidious. But if these measures are viewed together in the wider context of other government 
initiatives, they can be seen to be part of an obvious and deeper strategy by the government to 
suppress dissent and restructure or remove those institutions capable of holding the government to 
account or facilitating the development of a coherent ideological alternative. 
 
We can glimpse this strategy in many of the government’s actions across many policy areas. Most 
obviously, of course, we can see it in its stance on Europe which was split between support for 
Cameron’s negotiated ‘special status’ for Britain, exempting it from many of the formal mechanisms of 
oversight that can constrain government action, and the outright rejection of any and all such 
mechanisms as an undemocratic infringement of national sovereignty. But we can see it, too, in its 
expressed desire to reform the House of Lords following its resistance to key government legislation 
including the Investigatory Powers Bill and the reform of Tax Credits. And we can also see it the steps 
it has taken to structurally weaken the Labour party and the social and organizational bases from 
which a more social democratic or egalitarian grassroots movement might develop. It has sought to 
weaken the Labour party in parliament, through a redrawing of constituency boundaries which will 
result in a reduction in Labour MPs, but it has also gone further than this. Consider again the 
Lobbying Act which did not just marginalize the political voices of charities, but the capacity of all ‘non-
party’ organizations including trade unions to communicate their concerns to government, in ways 
which will have a disproportionate impact on the Labour party. In addition to imposing severe limits on 
the campaigning activities of charities and other non-party organisations, the Act cuts the funding the 
trade unions are allowed to contribute to Labour party election campaigns, and severely limits the kind 
of activities in which they can engage on behalf of Labour candidates, such as the organization of 
events, the operation of phone banks, the publication of election materials, and canvassing. When 
these measures are added to those proposed in the 2015 Trade Union Bill – for example, the 
strengthening of employers’ rights to hire strike-breaking staff, the criminalization of picketing, and 
new rules covering permissible party funding – it becomes clear that the government’s aim is to 
eviscerate unions of their money, their influence, and their political voice. Again on this issue, the 
government is saying one thing and doing another. It is saying it wants to make lobbying fairer and to 
even out the structural inequalities present in the British democratic system. However, it introduces 
laws designed to silence the trade unions and, by extension, their members, and to strengthen the 
corporate sector.  
 
What is more, the measures in the Lobbying Act and now those governing charities, seek to do the 
same to that network of civil society organisations and institutions which have traditionally played a 
central and galvanizing role in the development of an egalitarian social consciousness among British 
citizens: anti-poverty charities, human rights organizations, workers’ associations, environmental 
organizations, the kind of groups and organizations, like the unions, through which individuals might 
engage with others in a common fight against inequality or injustice and which have, traditionally, 
communicated the concerns of the left to those in power, either directly or indirectly.  
 
British politics has been characterized in recent months by a dramatic shift to the right. The EU 
referendum campaign revealed the breadth and depth of the British people’s concerns about 
immigration, and a perceived loss of national self-determination. As I write this piece, reports of racist 
violence in the wake of the referendum result have increased, and nationalist sentiments have been 
expressed in the political mainstream in a way unseen in recent years. The British working class has 
arguably never looked more fractured, more out of reach of mainstream party politics, or more 
disconnected from those in the Labour party and elsewhere who would seek to represent them. 
Nevertheless, many on the left believe that we are witnessing a resurgence of social democratic 
politics. To these people, the groundswell of support shown for Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour leadership 
bid in Britain in 2015, and again in July 2016 following the threats to Corbyn’s leadership from other 
parts of the party, as well as the in-roads into the American mainstream made by Bernie Sanders 
during his bid for the Democratic US presidential nomination, indicates a growing support in Britain 
and the USA for an alternative to the ideological commitment to free markets and minimal states 
common to the Conservatives and the Republicans. But as Corbyn and Sanders themselves have 
admitted, there is likely to be no leftist resurgence without a grassroots movement. Social democracy 
begins in the myriad activities of individuals committed to bringing about real and lasting social 
change. It requires a thriving civil society of organizations and associations through which people can 
come together to express their concerns and mobilize for political action. It is a bottom-up movement 
rooted in civil society and in individuals engaging with one another in and through associations which 
can inspire and galvanize them, but which also - in the case of interest groups and trade unions -  can 
give effective expression to common concerns to politicians.  
 
Given this, we should not be surprised by the extent of the rejection of the EU among so many of the 
Britain’s least advantaged citizens, or underestimate the challenge facing the left. The prospects of a 
long-term resurgence of social democratic politics look bleak. Already, for example, we are seeing 
evidence that the initial Corbyn surge is ebbing away. Corbyn’s position in the party has weakened, 
and many of those who voted for him in 2015, and who joined Labour in order to do so, are failing to 
participate actively in party activities or progressive politics more widely (Reidy, 2016). Corbyn has a 
clear ability to draw new members to the party in order to support him in successive leadership 
elections, but having joined and voted, these new members do little else. Their job done, these new 
members are returning to the fringes of democratic politics, or returning to political apathy one again. 
This should come as no surprise. Political participation, especially collective and face-to-face 
participation, is in decline, and has been for a long time (Hay, 2007; Parvin, 2009, 2011, 2015a; 
Parvin & McHugh, 2005; Stoker, 2006). Rates of political participation among British (and American) 
citizens are low, especially among those at the lower end of the wealth and income distribution 
(Bartels, 2008; Birch et al, 2013; Gilens, 2014; Macedo et al, 2005; Skocpol, 2004; Stoker, 2006; 
Whiteley, 2012). The breakdown of traditional class identities, shifts in the labour market, the growth 
of markets, demographic change, the eclipse of traditional associational life by new and more 
hierarchical forms of representative politics, entrenched social and economic inequalities, and the rise 
of new forms of governance have conspired with other factors to cut citizens off from the political 
system and to reshape citizens’ attitudes toward one another and their political system. The decline in 
political participation among the citizens of liberal democratic states, including Britain, and the 
disproportionately steep decline in participation among those who have the least access to important 
social resources like education and money, is an enduring and worsening problem for democracy. But 
it is also a profound and worsening problem for the left, which has more to lose from widespread 
political disengagement than the Conservatives. Political participation is lowest among those who 
have the most to gain from the development of a social democratic alternative to market capitalism 
and yet it is precisely the countries in which support for market capitalism is most entrenched that 
participation is at its lowest. Markets squeeze out institutions and organisations which give expression 
to the concerns of those who do least well under capitalism. Over the past four decades or so the 
traditional means by which the concerns of poorest members of society were communicated in the 
political system declined in strength and effectiveness and were replaced by organisations more 
suited to the communication of the needs of the middle classes (Putnam, 2001; Skocpol, 2003; 
Stoker, 2006). Decision making institutions have retreated further and further from citizens, and from 
poorer citizens in particular, such that many people do not even see themselves as connected in any 
meaningful way with the institutions that govern them, or the people who work in them (Mair, 2013). 
This is in part because those bridging institutions which acted on their behalf, and which provided 
information and representation in the democratic system, have withered. Even under New Labour, 
which arguably presided over a flowering of ‘big tent’ politics and ‘stakeholder’ democracy, broad-
based grassroots organisations quickly realized that in order to get a seat at the table they needed to 
reform themselves into more hierarchical, professionalized interest groups capable of working at the 
heart of government and speaking the language of the political elite. 
 
This process – this evisceration of the British public sphere that has left many of the poorest and most 
vulnerable members of society disaffected, disillusioned, and without a voice in the political system – 
is only partly explainable by large-scale global developments beyond the control of states and 
politicians. It is also driven by deliberate decisions made by those politicians. What arguably began in 
the early 1980s under Thatcher and continued under Blair and Brown in the 2000s has intensified 
since 2010 under Cameron. The reason the left has more to lose from the widespread political 
disengagement that the Prime Minister described in 2010 than do the Conservatives is because social 
democratic politics begins in, and relies more heavily upon, precisely the kind of broad-based political 
participation on the part of citizens that is currently in decline in Britain, a decline that is being 
hastened by the government. Through the measures introduced in a series of legislation including the 
Lobbying Act, the Trade Union Bill, and now the new rules on the use of public funding by charities, 
the government is systematically reforming British civil society and democratic life in ways which 
thwart the development of a social democratic grassroots movement. Looked at in this light, in the 
widest possible context, the new rules governing charities and the government’s failure to tackle 
corporate lobbying look anything but accidental or benign, and are intimately linked with the kind of 
politics that we now witness in Britain and which was laid bare by the referendum: a politics in which 
the working class are fractured and fragmented, in which civil society has been eviscerated, and the 
institutions and organisations which traditionally represented poorer and marginalized citizens have 
disappeared or been deliberately dismantled. That the current measures regulating lobbyists are 
unfair and give disproportionate influence to big businesses, corporations, and other wealthy vested 
interests should not come as a surprise. It is part of a wider commitment to choking off the possibility 
for dissent, and for any organized ideological alternative, at their source.  
 
The stakes for the left, and for British democracy, could not be higher, therefore. Those who share a 
vision of a more egalitarian, more socially just society grounded in social democratic principles need 
to be attentive to the damage that is being wrought by the government to the civic and social 
infrastructure necessary for shaping this vision and bringing it into reality. The challenge is significant. 
It requires nothing less than the reversal of the tide of civic decline and political disengagement that 
has characterized British politics for the past three decades. It requires participation, and, perhaps 
most importantly of all, it requires the organized defence of those institutions, organisations, and 
associations which have traditionally provided space and focus for social democrats to pursue their 
collective ends, to forge new alliances, to express their shared concerns, and to speak to decision 
makers. There have been moves in this direction and the building of a social democratic grassroots 
movement is something that Momentum, for example, has taken as central (Klug, Rees, & Schneider, 
2016). Whether Momentum itself is the right organisation to be pushing for this remains to be seen, 
given the controversial place it occupies in British politics and even within the Labour party. 
Nevertheless, their central message is correct: top-down reform can be resisted and reversed, but 
only by pressure exerted by a grassroots movement which has carved out the space for itself to 
operate and to grow, and which is represented in the democratic system by institutions which are 
given a fair hearing. David Cameron was right in 2010 to lament the state of British democracy. He 
was right to be concerned about political disenchantment among British citizens. But was wrong to 
make this worse, and wrong to further entrench the very political inequalities that he claimed to be 
worried about. In order to reverse the damage, the left needs to provide its own answer to political 
disengagement. It needs to piece together the fragments of civil society that remain intact and work 
with one another to to build a grassroots movement which articulates a clear alternative vision for 
Britain. This is a Herculean task, and a long term one, as it needs to do so in the face of 
overwhelming political, civic, cultural, and structural challenges. And it needs to do so before the 
associations and organisations on which this movement might be built, and through which this vision 
might be communicated, are gone. 
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